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Does tort law deter risky behavior in individuals? We explore this question
by examining the relationship between tort immunity and volunteering.
During the 1980s and 1990s, nearly every state provided some degree of
volunteer immunity. Congress followed with the 1997 Volunteer Protection
Act. This article analyzes these acts, identifying three motivations for them:
the chilling effects of tort liability, limits on liability insurance, and moral
concerns. Using data from the Independent Survey’s Giving and Volunteer-
ing surveys, we then identify a large and positive correlation between immu-
nity and volunteering. We next consider the implications of the findings for
tort theory and nonprofit law.
I. Introduction
Does tort law deter risky behavior? This question lies at the center of a major
debate in tort law. Some scholars suggest that individuals respond to liability
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risk with increased care or by avoiding risky activities altogether. Others
criticize deterrence theories as unrealistic since they assume that prospective
tortfeasors understand risk and law. Despite considerable theoretical
research on the deterrent effects of tort law, few empirical studies examine
whether liability affects risk taking. Even these few previous studies do not
lead easily to generalizable conclusions because they mostly focus on medical
malpractice (which is confounded by professional duties, organizational
relationships, mandatory insurance laws, and the high costs of relocating
across state lines) and automobile accidents (which are muddied by insur-
ance mandates and criminal law). An individual’s decision to volunteer,
however, does not involve such complications.
Here, we examine the relationship between volunteer tort immunity
and volunteering. During the 1980s and 1990s, state lawmakers worried that
tort liability was harming nonprofits and responded by immunizing at least
some volunteers from suit. Congress followed with the 1997 Volunteer Pro-
tection Act (VPA), which provided immunity for volunteers in states without
immunity laws.1 By comparing volunteer rates across states with different
liability regimes, we attempt to identify the effect of a reduction in tort
exposure—a reduction in the price of volunteering—on volunteering.
We find systematic differences in volunteer rates between states with
and without volunteer tort immunity. We provide new, albeit preliminary,
evidence suggesting that individuals reduce their activity-level engagement
by foregoing volunteering in the face of liability exposure. These results
support economic deterrence theories of tort law, countering criticism that
such theories do not accurately reflect human behavior and that the laws
have little or no effect. Our findings are particularly interesting because they
illustrate how liability exposure might influence individuals rather than
corporations, which are more likely than individuals to internalize the costs
of risky behavior.2
Moreover, the results offer an approximate quantitative estimate of
foregone volunteering by providing a ballpark figure for the activity-level
opportunity cost of tort liability. They also suggest the economic costs if
government, rather than volunteers, provides these foregone services or the
indirect costs to society if it does not. Although policymakers should con-
1The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501–14505.
2Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of Employee Reason-
ableness, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1705 (1996).
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sider these activity-level effects, we caution that they are only one part of the
equation necessary to determine the social utility of tort law. Without iden-
tifying the benefits of tort law (e.g., the accident avoided, the extra care
induced by liability exposure) and other important factors, such as tort’s
distributive effects, policymakers cannot determine whether suits against
volunteers are worth the cost of foregone volunteering.
This study further considers whether, and under what circumstances,
property rules (enacted through bargaining and contracting) or liability
rules (enacted through tort) provide a better mechanism to distribute the
costs of accidents. Because volunteering is not a sudden, unexpected event
like a skiing or bicycling accident, volunteers have ample time to contract
around tort liability. They are able to buy insurance or ask charities to
indemnify them and, at least under certain circumstances, the transaction
costs are probably quite low. Much volunteering, therefore, occurs under
conditions in which theory predicts that people are most likely to rely on
contracts to protect themselves from tort liability. Instead, we find that
volunteers seek protection from tort law not by contracting but by attempt-
ing to change liability rules.
We also contribute to the research on volunteering, something almost
half of Americans—donating 15.5 billion hours or the equivalent of $239.2
billion—do every year.3 Although many economists have studied the deter-
minants of monetary contributions to charities, few have considered the
factors influencing labor contributions, and those who have done so have
focused primarily on the wage-labor tradeoff. Previous legal research is
similarly sparse. Articles about the immunity acts and their consequences
speculate, without evidence, about the incentive effects of liability exposure
on volunteering.
3The Independent Sector, Giving and Volunteering in the United States 2 (2001), available at
〈http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/GV01keyfind.pdf〉. Sources disagree regarding the
magnitude of volunteering. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, only 28.8 percent of
Americans volunteered in the year ending September 2004. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Volun-
teering in the United States 1 (2004), available at 〈http://www.bls.gov/news/release.acchives/
volun_12092005.pdf〉. Using the Independent Sector estimates, annual volunteering is
equivalent to nearly 8 percent of the private, nonfarm hours worked in the United States (15.5
billion volunteer hours equals the full-time equivalent of 8.69 million workers/year, assuming a
nonfarm economy average of 1,783.6 hours/year). See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Employment, Hours, and Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics
survey (National), available at 〈http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet〉 (last
visited Sept. 4, 2006).
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Finally, the results are policy relevant. They help determine whether
immunity encourages volunteering, which politicians commonly support. In
1993, President George H. W. Bush even claimed that “every serious social
problem is being solved through voluntary service.”4 The question of volun-
teer immunity has come up in several other political contexts. Good Samari-
tan laws, which predate volunteer immunity statutes, provide some immunity
for accidents caused by uncompensated assistance in an emergency. The fear
that lawsuits would discourage “able citizens from acceptance of public
office” led the Supreme Court to grant qualified immunity to many officials
for civil rights violations.5 More recently, had the 2005 Katrina VPA passed
the Senate, it would have extended the VPA by immunizing Hurri-
cane Katrina volunteers from the costs of accidents caused by their gross
negligence.6
We describe the immunity acts and their justifications in Section II, and
summarize related research in Section III. Section IV details our data and
methodology. Section V provides the results, sensitivity tests, and research
limitations. We discuss the implications of the findings in Section VI.
II. Immunity Laws
During the 1980s and 1990s, impassioned advocacy persuaded state and
federal legislatures to immunize volunteers from civil lawsuits. Senator
Spencer Abraham declared that “[f]rivolous litigation is an attack on altru-
ism itself,” Senator John Ashcroft invoked de Tocqueville on the matter, and
President George H. W. Bush decried volunteer liability because “it’s time
that we ought to care for each other more and sue each other less.”7 We
examined legislative histories, news reports, and press releases to find these
4George H. W. Bush, Remarks at a Celebration of the Points of Light, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc 42, 43 (Jan. 14, 1993).
5Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
6Katrina Volunteer Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3736, 109th Cong. (as passed by House, Sept.
14, 2005).
7Spencer Abraham, Litigation’s Stranglehold on Charities, 127 Pub. Int. 96, 97 (1997); Volun-
teer Liability Legislation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 15 (1997)
[hereinafter 1997 Hearing] (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft); Bush, supra note 4, at 43.
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sentiments translated into three categories of justifications for the sweep of
federal and state immunity legislation: (1) instrumental claims regarding the
chilling effect of liability on volunteering; (2) both instrumental and nor-
mative claims about the liability insurance crisis, sometimes framed more
generally as a “liability crisis”; and (3) particularly at the federal level, a
normative claim that volunteers should not be sued.
A. State Law
1. Statutes
State legislators acted first. Between 1984 and 1997, 29 states and the District
of Columbia adopted legislation providing some immunity from civil suits to
all volunteers (see Table 1 and the Appendix). Others protect only specific
volunteer categories, such as firefighters, coaches, mediators, or librarians
Table 1: State Immunity Regime
No Immunity States Negligence Immunity States High Immunity States
Alaska Arizona (1993) Alabama (W 1991)
California Arkansas (1987) Colorado (W 1992)
Connecticut Delaware (1989) District Columbia (W 1993)
Florida Hawaii (1997) Georgia (W 1987)
Illinois Maine (1987) Idaho (W 1987)
Indiana Maryland (1987) Iowa (I 1987)
Kentucky Mississippi (1988) Kansas (W 1987)
Louisiana North Carolina (1987) Minnesota (R 1989)
Massachusetts North Dakota (1987) Montana (W 1987)
Michigan New Hampshire (1988) Nevada (W 1987)
Missouri New Jersey (1987) Rhode Island (W 1984)
Nebraska Oklahoma (1995) Texas (R 1987)
New Mexico Pennsylvania (1988) Utah (W 1990)
New York South Carolina (1984) Wisconsin (W 1987)
Ohio South Dakota (1987) Minnesota (R 1989)
Oregon Washington (2001) Montana (W 1987)
Tennessee Wyoming (1992) Nevada (W 1987)
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Note: R = shields up to reckless (i.e., gross negligence); W = shields up to willful/wanton (i.e.,
gross negligence and recklessness); I = shields up to intentional (i.e., gross negligence, reck-
lessness, and willful/wanton).
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(for damages resulting from information contained in library materials).8
We analyzed each state statute to determine the scope of immunity.9 In
almost all cases, the statutory language granting immunity to a class of
volunteers is clear, although some statutes require more interpretation.10
The statutes typically specify the lowest standard of care for which volunteers
may face liability.11 If a statute permits liability for one standard, it allows
8Ala. Code § 6-5-335 (firefighters); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2798 (coaches); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 154.055 (mediators); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 5782 (librarians).
9We collected state statutes on Westlaw with the query “volunteer /s liab!”, and compared the
results with (1) Nonprofit Risk Management Center, State Liability Laws for Charitable Organi-
zation and Volunteers (Sept. 2001), available at 〈http://www.nonprofitrisk.org/downloads/
state-liability.pdf〉, and (2) a report by Daniel Kurtz, Holland & Knight LLP (on file with authors).
10For example, the Georgia statute covers “[a] person serving with or without compensation as
a member, director, or trustee, or as an officer of the board without compensation, of any
nonprofit hospital or association or of any nonprofit, charitable, or eleemosynary institution or
organization.” Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-20. Georgia courts interpret “member” to include non-
managerial volunteers and employees. Stephens v. Conyers Apostolic Church, 532 S.E.2d 728,
730 n.4 (Ga. App. 2000) (holding that a pastor employed by a church fell within scope of
statute), cert. denied (Ga. 2000); Zarach v. Atlanta Claims Ass’n, 500 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Ga. App. 1998)
(assuming the statute covers a volunteer seminar instructor for a nonprofit), reconsideration
denied (Ga. App. 1998). South Carolina grants immunity to “employee[s],” defined as “an agent,
servant, employee, or officer of a charitable organization.” S.C. Code Ann. § 33-56-170(2). We
interpret South Carolina as immunizing all volunteers because (1) an Attorney General opinion
concludes that a physician giving high school athletic physicals on a volunteer basis, without
compensation, would probably be immune from liability, 1989 Op Atty Gen, No. 89-83, p. 218,
and (2) the statute only protects uncompensated individuals.
11In some cases, identifying the standard was difficult. Maine protects volunteers “[w]hen the
cause of action sounds in negligence.” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 158-A (2005). We code Maine
as immunizing negligence but not gross negligence. Pennsylvania does not immunize volun-
teers when the “conduct of such person falls substantially below the standards generally prac-
ticed and accepted in like circumstances by similar persons.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8332.4 (2005).
This likely means gross negligence. See Sewickley Twp. Volunteer Fire Co. No. 3 v. First Nat.
Bank of Herminie, 8 Pa. D. & C. 4th 297, 300 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1990) (holding that plaintiff must
allege at least gross negligence for claim to be outside scope of statute). Texas imposes liability
when the volunteer’s act was “intentional, willfully negligent, or done with conscious indiffer-
ence or reckless disregard for the safety of others.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 84.007(a).
Because earlier Texas case law defines “willfully negligent” to apply to a person who is “con-
scious, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his
conduct will naturally or probably result in injury,” Glassman v. Feldman, 106 S.W.2d 721, 723
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (quoting Sorrell v. White, 153 A. 359, 362 (Vt. 1931)), we classify the
statute as immunizing up to recklessness. We treat Florida, Missouri, Ohio, and Kentucky as
having no immunity. Interpretation of the Florida, Missouri, and Ohio statutes is difficult
because they appear to impose liability for negligent acts, thereby effectively draining the laws
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liability for all standards involving greater culpability. Therefore, a statute
that allows volunteers to be sued when they act with gross negligence will
permit a suit when they act intentionally. The statutes commonly include
exceptions, such as wrongful acts committed while operating a motor
vehicle, exposing many volunteers to liability risk.12
2. Justifications: Why Did the States Pass These Laws?
State legislatures passed immunity laws to: (1) increase volunteering, (2)
address an insurance crisis, and (3) maintain fairness. First, legislators
worried that liability hindered volunteer recruitment, and reasoned that
immunity would encourage volunteering. For example, the New Jersey
Assembly Insurance Committee’s statement to the Senate explains that “[b]y
giving immunity to trustees, officers, directors, and other uncompensated
volunteers, the bill’s purpose is to permit nonprofit and charitable organi-
zations to continue to attract able people to serve in these capacities.”13
Volunteers, however, seemed to face little risk of suit before immunity
laws were passed. In a survey of state law, the Nonprofit Risk Management
of any force. Florida immunizes volunteers “acting as an ordinary reasonably prudent person
would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.” Fla. Stat. § 768.1355. As Florida
courts note, this is the usual negligence standard. Campbell v. Kessler, 848 So. 2d 369, 371 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Botte v. Pomeroy, 438 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fl. App. 1983). We unsuccessfully
investigated bill hearings for any explanation of using the standard in the statute. Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Court Systems, Probate, and Consumer Law, Feb. 10, 1993 (audio-
tapes and notes on file with authors). Missouri allows liability when damage is caused “by the
negligence of such volunteer,” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.118(2)(2), whereas Ohio permits liability for
“[a]n action or omission of the volunteer [that] constitutes negligence.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2305.38(D)(2). Although the negligence standard immunizes volunteers from strict liability
suits, this is an unsatisfying explanation because volunteers are unlikely to face a strict liability
claim. Michael Mayer, Stepping In to Step Out of Liability: The Proper Standard of Liability for
Referees in Foreseeable Judgment-Call Situations, 3 DePaul J. Sports L. & Contemp. Probs. 54,
81 n.160 (2005); Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements for Volunteers in Youth
Activities—The Alternative to “Nerf®” Tiddlywinks, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 683, 754 (1992). Although
Kentucky passed an immunity statute in 1988, an Attorney General opinion found that it violates
the three sections of the state constitution providing that the legislature “shall have no power to
limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or
property.” 1988–1991 Ky. Op. Atty. Gen. 2-637, Ky. OAG 91-89, 1991 WL 533922 (Ky. A.G.).
12See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.10(a)(3).
13Assembly Insurance Committee Statement to Senate, No. 2705, State of New Jersey (Feb. 5,
1987). See also, e.g., Washington Senate Bill Report 1643, Senate Committee on Judiciary (Mar.
29, 2001).
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Center identified only a handful of cases against ordinary volunteers.14
Rather, the reported cases typically involved nonprofit directors (primarily
over labor disputes), auto accidents, quasi-governmental volunteers who are
generally afforded sovereign immunity (e.g., for community members
serving on government committees), or vicarious liability suits against non-
profit organizations for their volunteers’ negligence.15
Our own efforts to find lawsuits against nondirector volunteers also
produced few results. Although we do not know whether volunteers settled,
we found few documented suits against them. In a search of all cases with
written decisions over the past 40 years—covering the period before and
after the Acts—we found only 60 cases against volunteers, almost none of
whom would be immune under the Acts.16 Of these 60 cases, 23 were against
volunteer firefighters (typically based on negligent driving and, therefore,
exempted from immunity); three were for negligent driving by other volun-
teers; eight were sex related (usually against youth leaders for child moles-
tation and, therefore, intentional torts exempted from immunity); and 19
involved nontort claims, such as antitrust, Fair Labor Standards Act, discrimi-
nation, interference with contract, and other claims brought in the employ-
ment context. From 1978 through 2006, only seven cases alleged a
straightforward negligence claim; of these, five invoked state acts and two
invoked the VPA, with one invoking both. Moreover, the supervising non-
profit or government agency was also almost always a named defendant, so
the risk to the volunteer’s assets was minimal. In fact, although threats to
14Nonprofit Risk Management Center, supra note 9. These few cases include: Junkins v. Glencoe
Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 685 So. 2d 769 (Ala Civ. App. 1996) (firefighter immune); Knowles v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 781 So. 2d 211, 212 (Ala. 2000) (hayride operator immune); Matlock
v. Hankel, 707 So. 2d 1016, 1020 (La. App. 1998) (presuming volunteer firefighter might be
immune); Frields v. St. Joseph’s, 702 A.2d 353 (N.J. Super. Ct. A.D. 1997) (rescue squad
immune); Spruill v. Lake Phelps Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 523 S.E.2d 672 (N.C. 2000) (firefighters
immune for spilling water, which froze and caused car accident).
15See, e.g., cases granting sovereign immunity to government volunteers assuming employee-
type roles, such as Yonker By & Through Helstrom v. Thompson, 939 P.2d 530 (Colo. App.
1997) (guardian ad litem granted sovereign immunity when child under his supervision was
kidnapped); Trotter v. School Dist. 218, 733 N.E.2d 363 (Ill. App. 2000) (volunteer lifeguards
are employees under tort immunity act); Kennedy v. State, 730 A.2d 1252 (Me. 1999) (volunteer
guardian ad litem held to be state employee).
16We searched Westlaw using the terms “sy(volunteer liab! Sue lawsuit tort) & volunteer/
10defendant.”
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personal funds are used to achieve settlements in tort suits, parties generally
settle claims only with insurance proceeds.17
It is not surprising, therefore, that legislators commonly emphasized
the perception rather than the true risk of suit. The Alabama statute asserts
that “[t]he willingness of volunteers to offer their services has been increas-
ingly deterred by a perception that they put personal assets at risk in the
event of tort actions seeking damages arising from their activities as volun-
teers.”18 Hawaii legislators surveyed state nonprofits to determine the true
volunteer liability risk and concluded that “[a]lthough a perception lingers
that use of volunteers increases the threat of lawsuits demanding astronomi-
cal damages, this does not appear to be the reality experienced by Hawaii’s
nonprofits.”19 In fact, the Nonprofit Risk Management Center concludes:
Although we are somewhat doubtful about the claims that large numbers of
persons have declined to volunteer due to fear about personal liability, we
acknowledge that these fears have persisted during the past two decades. Over
the past few years, . . . [we have] . . . received dozens of calls from volunteers
expressing concern about the potential for personal liability. . . . [W]e have yet
to hear from someone whose fear of liability has led to the decision to cease
participating as a volunteer in any form.20
A few highly publicized lawsuits against volunteers may have convinced
legislators that there was a volunteer liability crisis. In a case that reportedly
settled for $25,000, parents sued their son’s Little League coach when a ball
injured his eye, claiming that the 10-year-old was unaccustomed to playing
17Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 Law
& Soc’y Rev. 275 (2001).
18Ala. Code § 6-5-336(b)(1). See also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-6-102 (“While there are no known
recent instances in Arkansas where a volunteer has been subjected to personal liability for
negligence in performing volunteer duties . . . , the recent publicity generated in relation to the
perceived insurance crisis has heightened concern among many who would provide volunteer
services.”).
19Charlotte A Carter-Yamauchi, Hawaii Legislative Research Bureau, Volunteerism, A Risky
Business? (1996), available at 〈http://www.state.hi.us/lrb/rpts96/vol/voldoc.html〉. Only three
nonprofits reported that “any suit involving a volunteer had been filed or threatened; and one
of these involved an injury to a volunteer, as opposed to an injury caused as a result of a
volunteer’s acts or omissions.” None of the “responding organizations reported knowing of
another nonprofit organization that had been sued or threatened with suit.”
20Nonprofit Risk Management Center, supra note 9, at 4.
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second base and had not been trained to field balls correctly.21 Another
lawsuit that sparked outrage involved a young mountain climber who
became quadriplegic after a 90-foot fall; he sued the volunteers who partici-
pated in a nighttime helicopter evacuation for $11 million, alleging “reckless
and negligent” rescue techniques, but later dropped the case.22 Others may
have sought liability reform because they feared a future decline in volun-
teering, possibly caused by increasing female workforce participation.23
Second, legislators may have reacted to a widely publicized liability and
insurance crisis.24 This crisis was commonly believed to have “disrupted
product and service markets” through drastically increased premiums across
diverse activities, including medical care, recreational activities, and trans-
portation.25 Reform advocates linked many social ills to the insurance crisis,
21Abraham, supra note 7, at 100–01 (citing this among other examples of “frivolous” suits against
volunteers); Jamie Brown, Legislators Strike Out: Volunteer Little League Coaches Should Not
Be Immune from Tort Liability, 7 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 559, 559–60 (1997); 1997 Hearing,
supra note 7, at 21 (statement of Rep. John Edward Porter); Risks of Liability Deter Youth
Coaches, Charlotte Observer, Apr. 11, 1986; Robert Seltzer, Suit Throws a Curve at Little
League, Phila. Inquirer, July 21, 1985. See also King, supra note 11, at 694–95; Laura A. Kiernan,
Legal Threat Casts Pall: Legislators Debate Volunteers’ Liability When Injury Claimed; Propos-
als Offer Range of Immunity, Boston Globe, Jan. 17, 1988; Good Sports: Coach Immunity Bill
Becomes Law, Phila. Daily News, May 13, 1986, for general discussion of little league liability.
22David O. Weber, A Thousand Points of Fright? 52 Ins. Rev. 40 (1991); Volunteer Protection
Act of 1987 Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Admin. Practice: Hearing
on S. 929/H.R. 911, 100th Cong., 190-92 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Hearing] (testimony of Kevin
Walker, volunteer, Riverside Mountain Rescue).
23Charles T. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving 143, 168–70 (1985).
24Jay Mathews, Torts and a Tug on the Heartstrings; In the Battle Over Liability Law, Ads Put
Emotion on the Front Line, Wash. Post, May 10, 1995; Weber, supra note 22, at 40; The Liability
Crisis: Companies, Consumers and Courts; Are Insurers Caught in a Squeeze or Putting it On?
N.Y. Times, May 25, 1986; Nancy L. Ross, Insurance Firms Profit from Crisis; Liability Scare
Ebbs, But Rates Still Rise, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1986; John F. Russo, New Jersey Opinion: Who
is at Fault and What Can be done About Insurance?; Accountability is a Prime Need, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 31, 1986; Carol McGraw, Insurance Problems Threaten the Future of Women’s Clinics,
L.A. Times, Oct. 2, 1987.
25George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521, 1521
(1987). For effects on nonprofits, see Brenda A. Trolin, Legislatures Awaken to Nonprofits Hit
by Liability Insurance Crisis, 2 Preventive L. Rep. 12, 14 (1987); Development in the Law, 23
Willamette L. Rev 211, 324 (1987) (citing Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.264 (1986)); George J.
Church, Sorry, Your Policy Is Cancelled, Time Magazine, Mar. 24, 1986.
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including, perhaps most dramatically, obstetricians walking off the job.26
Insurers blamed “greedy lawyers, mushy-headed juries and a litigious
culture,” whereas lawyers retorted that premium increases were caused by
interest rate declines and an insurance business cycle.27 Regardless of the
reason for high premiums, tort reform was believed to be the answer. Several
states implemented “no-fault” insurance during the mid-1980s when auto-
motive insurance rates peaked.28 States also regulated medical malpractice
insurance, and others called for limiting product liability.29
This general trend affected nonprofits as well, with the average cost of
liability insurance for them increasing by 155 percent in 1987,30 and with
many nonprofits concerned about their ability to insure at all.31 After being
inundated by constituent complaints, Washington State legislators con-
cluded that “[t]he public interest is not being served by the commercial
underwriters.”32 Legislators believed that liability protection was needed
26Jill R. Horwitz & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injury: A Case Study,
14 Health Aff. 164, 166 (1995).
27The Liability Crisis: Companies, Consumers and Courts; Are Insurers Caught in a Squeeze or
Putting it On? N.Y. Times, May 25, 1986; Russo, supra note 24.
28Harvey Rosenfield, Auto Insurance: Crisis and Reform, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 69, 74–76, 78 (1998).
29Carrie Lynn Vine, Comment, Addressing the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Alterna-
tives to Damage Caps, 26 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 413, 414 (2006); sources cited by Steven P. Croley &
Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products
Liability, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 7 nn.26–27 (1991).
30David W. Hartmann, Volunteer Immunity: Maintaining the Vitality of the Third Sector of Our
Economy, 10 U. Bridgeport L. Rev. 63, 77 (1989); William Presecky, Insurance Woes Strike
Prairie Path, Chi. Trib., Jan. 29, 1986; Testimony of Terry Grundy, United Appeal & Community
Chest of the Cincinnati Area to the Ohio Senate State and Local Government Committee, May
13, 1986; Testimony of Judith Tieman Bird, Ohio Citizens’ Council, to the Ohio Senate State
and Local Government Committee, May 13, 1986.
31Randy Loftis, Salvation Army Bells Silenced at Malls, Miami Herald, Dec. 24, 1986; Joseph
Williams, Program to Give Rides to Drinkers is Cancelled, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 20,
1986; Chris Kinyon, Law May Dampen Lawton’s Parades, Daily Oklahoman, Dec. 14, 1986;
Victoria Stevens, Volunteers Quit Youth Agency Board Over Insurance Cuts, Toronto Star, Oct
6, 1986; Mark Toohey, Galveston Housing Board Members Resign, Houston Chron., July 29,
1986.
32Jeri A. Carver, Immunity for Nonprofit Corporations (RCW 4.24.264), 23 Willamette L. Rev.
321, 324 (1987) (quoting Dick Marquart, Cover Letter, Report to the Legislature from the Joint
Study Committee on Insurance Availability and Affordability 1 (Nov. 12, 1985)).
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either to encourage insurers to cover volunteers or to protect those without
coverage.33
Third, state legislators believed that holding volunteers liable for neg-
ligence was unfair. Florida representatives identified the need “to strike a
balance between the right of a person to seek redress for injury and the right
of an individual to freely give of his time and energy without compensation
as a volunteer in service to his community without fear of personal liability
for acts undertaken in good faith absent willful or wanton conduct volun-
teer . . . . ”34 Some went further, arguing that even nonfrivolous claims
against volunteers are unfair because it is wrong to penalize well-intentioned
people, whereas immunity opponents wondered why volunteers should be
immune, since “[t]here doesn’t need to be immunity unless they did some-
thing wrong.”35
B. Federal Law
The 1997 VPA roughly tracked the state statutes. After 12 failed attempts,
Illinois Congressman John Porter introduced a bill that overcame the fed-
eralism objections that had doomed earlier efforts.36 Under the VPA, a
33Bills Seek to Shield Volunteers, Charities from Liability Woes, Dallas Morning News, Jan. 28,
1987; Carolyn Acker, Senate Passes 16 Bills on Liability Insurance, Phila. Inquirer, Dec 5, 1986;
Harry Berkowitz, Insurance as a Sure Thing? Sigh of Relief from Public on Liability, Newsday,
July 1, 1986; Sharon Phillips, A New Liability Law Spurs Debate Over Insurance Rates, Phila.
Inquirer, June 26, 1986 (attributing Philadelphia director statute “in part” to insurance crisis);
Gerald Cardinale, Opinion: Plan to Reform Insurance, The Record, July 13, 1986 (NJ state
senator arguing that volunteer immunity bill (among others) will “result in lower premiums and
will increase the availability of liability insurance”).
34Billy Buzzett, Staff Attorney, Florida House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary,
Florida Volunteer Immunity Act Summary (on file with the authors).
35Dennis Romboy, Proposed Act Would Shield Volunteers from Suits, Deseret News, Jan. 20,
2001.
36Mary Jacoby, House OKs Liability Protection for Volunteers, Chi. Trib., May 22, 1997, at 13;
Alfred R. Light, Conscripting State Law to Protect Volunteers: The Odd Formulation of Feder-
alism in “Opt-Out” Preemption, 10 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 9, 14 (2000); George Constantine,
How Landmark Legislation Evolved; Special Report: The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 49
Assoc. Mgmt. 36 (1997). Previous attempts, such as the Volunteer Protection Act of 1991, H.R.
911, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., tried to overcome these objections by making state compliance
optional with a 1 percent increase in Social Service Block Grants. Section 5(a); 1988 Hearing,
supra note 22, at 25–28 (discussion between Sen. Thurmond and Rep. Porter on federalism
concerns). Although the VPA’s constitutionality is untested, one state passed its own Act out of
596 Horwitz and Mead
volunteer will not be liable for harm he or she causes while negligently
performing services for a nonprofit or government entity, with several excep-
tions, including liability for gross negligence, willful or criminal misconduct,
hate crimes, sexual offenses, volunteering under the influence, or injuries
from motor vehicle use.37 The Act also limits punitive damages to situations
where the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the volun-
teer’s actions constituted “willful or criminal misconduct, or a conscious,
flagrant indifference to the rights or safety” of the plaintiff and eliminates
joint and several liability for noneconomic damage awards.38 The VPA pre-
empts inconsistent state laws but explicitly saves from preemption state laws
that offer additional liability protection to volunteers.39 It also permits states
to opt out of the statute for suits between their own citizens by passing a
statute explicitly expressing intent to permit liability.40
Advocates supported the federal Act for similar reasons to those
advanced for state immunity. First, some worried that the fear of tort liability,
unfounded or otherwise, discouraged volunteering. Representative Porter
explained that the legislation:
addresses a very real problem, and that is the chilling effect that is felt by
volunteers across this country that they might somehow be named a party
defendant in a lawsuit and have to go to court and hire a lawyer and defend
themselves. And what the legislation does is remove that and say the organization
remains liable but the volunteer can come forward, serve as a direct service
volunteer or on a volunteer board, without worry that they have to go to court
and hire a lawyer.41
concern that the VPA would be struck down as exceeding Congress’s power. Washington Senate
Bill Report 1643, Senate Committee on Judiciary (Mar. 29, 2001).
37The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501–14505. Earlier versions exempted
up to willful and wanton behavior. VPA of 1987, S. 929, 100th Cong. (1987). Momans v.
St. John’s Nw. Military Acad., 2000 WL 33976543, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2000) (holding
that VPA does not apply to fraud claims).
3842 U.S.C. §§ 14503(e)(1), 14504(b).
3942 U.S.C. § 14502(a). The statute also bars claims brought under federal law. Armendarez v.
Glendale Youth Ctr., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1140–41 (D. Ariz. 2003).
4042 U.S.C. § 14502(b). New Hampshire is the only state that has opted out, despite having its
own Act. 1998 N.H. Laws 129:1.
41News Conference on the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, June 11, 1997, Federal Information
Systems Corporation, Federal News Service.
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When Porter introduced the 1987 version of the bill, he was more
succinct: “The purpose behind this legislation is one thing, and one thing
only—that is, to keep volunteers volunteering in our country.”42 Other poli-
ticians pointed to the role of tort liability in declining volunteerism as a
particular problem in the context of a shrinking government.43
Second, supporters found it inappropriate for nonprofits to spend a
considerable, and rising, portion of their budgets on insurance. It particu-
larly upset legislators to learn that “the Little League’s biggest cost isn’t bats
and balls, but legal and insurance costs associated with liability.”44 (It is
unclear whether these legal fees were for defending volunteers, other liabil-
ity issues, or even unrelated legal services such as negotiating licenses.)
Third, supporters believed that lawsuits are frivolous and accidents
simply a part of life. According to John Ashcroft, then Senator from Missouri,
the bill:
goes to the heart of who we are. . . . [T]hat those who would hold themselves out
to help their fellow citizens would have to offer as a potential the well-being of
their own families because of the opportunity or potential for legal liability is an
idea that is offensive. . . . [H]ow many . . . volunteers can afford to have that kind
of exposure? I was a Boy Scout, I remember playing touch football. We played
worse than that. It is the nature of boys. We played fox over the hill. You just had
to run from one line to another line without getting knocked down, tackled or
beat up.45
421988 Hearing, supra note 22, at 7 (testimony of the Honorable John. E. Porter). Some did not
agree. H.R. Rep. 105-101(I) at 18 (dissenting views) (“The literature does not reveal a single
independent study, much less a juried piece of research, suggesting that federally imposed tort
immunity will increase the number, frequency, or quality of volunteers.”).
431997 Hearing, supra note 7, at 1–3 (introductory statement by Rep. Henry J. Hyde).
44H.R. Rep. 105-101(I) at 6. Upon the passage of the VPA, Newt Gingrich commented, “the Girl
Scouts in Washington DC alone had sold—I think it was 87,000 boxes of cookies just in order to
be able to pay their legal and litigation and liability insurance, and that Little League actually
pays more nationally for legal fees and liability insurance than they pay for baseballs and bats.
And average common-sense folks understand that makes no sense at all.” News Conference on
the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, June 11, 1997, Federal Information Systems Corporation,
Federal News Service.
451997 Hearing, supra note 7, at 16 (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft) (discussing a judgment of
$4 million, reduced from $7 million, against the Boy Scouts and volunteers for negligent
supervision on a trip where a scout suffered a paralyzing injury during a game of touch football).
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The New Jersey Little League suit was mentioned frequently in the press and
in debates regarding the federal legislation.46 A common theme was that it is
simply unfair to hold liable those who act generously.47
According to law professor Andrew Popper, the only dissenting voice in
the 1997 VPA hearings before Congress, the Act was a class-based transfer
from those who are injured to those who injure, one motivated only by
politics and not by a genuine concern for volunteerism.48 Popper character-
ized tort victims as “a highly vulnerable group, legally unsophisticated, often
powerless to select the person who will assist them, and sometimes unable to
discern inappropriate behavior.”49 Although the costs of immunity to injured
parties were hardly mentioned in the 1997 hearings, Representative Porter
had earlier proposed that immunity be withheld from volunteers at organi-
zations subject to charitable or sovereign immunity.50
III. Previous Scholarship
A. Legal Scholarship
Legal research on volunteer immunity statutes focuses on their fairness
or incentive effects, particularly whether liability exposure discourages
46Aaron Epstein, Congressional Leaders Back Bill to Limit Liability of Volunteers, Knight
Ridder, Apr. 29, 1997. Tort reform opponents charge VPA supporters with omitting important
facts from their accounts, such as the fact that the boy hit by the fly ball underwent five
operations and there was evidence of careless coaching. The judgment in the Oregon case cited
by Senator Ashcroft—in which the plaintiff was disabled—“was paid by the Boy Scout’s insur-
ance company, not the volunteers.” Id.
47John Porter, End the Liability of Volunteers, Chi. Trib., Aug. 24, 1986 (“Why should the assets
of board members of the Junior League be jeopardized for a slip-and-fall injury in the local thrift
shop? . . . We should not have to fear placing family assets at risk when we donate our time and
talent without compensation to serve our communities.”); 1997 Hearing, supra note 7, at 54
(testimony of Lynn Swann, Immediate Past President of Big Brothers, Big Sisters of America)
(“You would not take a mother and father and sue them . . . [b]ut a Big Brother Big Sister, you
could.”); 1997 Hearing, supra note 7, at 98 (testimony of Charles Tremper, Founder, Nonprofit
Risk Management Center) (“The fundamental question goes beyond one of empirical data: Is
it fair to ask volunteers to risk their personal assets as a condition of helping others?”).
48Andrew F. Popper, A One-Term Tort Reform Tale: Victimizing the Vulnerable, 35 Harv. J. on
Legis. 123, 137 (1998).
49Id. at 134.
501988 Hearing, supra note 22, at 12–13 (statement of John Porter).
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volunteering.51 First, scholars concerned with fairness note that, in the vol-
unteer context, immunity shifts the cost of accidents from volunteers onto
nonprofit entities or, worse, accident victims. Some find this welfare
enhancing because organizations may be better able to manage risk than
individual volunteers, particularly because organizations can select, train,
and supervise their volunteers.52 It may also, however, require organiza-
tions to limit their use of volunteers, which may be either welfare enhanc-
ing or welfare decreasing depending on the nature of the volunteers.
Further, if organizations cannot satisfy judgments or are immune them-
selves, the injured party, commonly someone of low to moderate income,
bears the loss.53 Whether this result is unfair depends on the significance
of compensation as a justification for tort law and one’s views on the
appropriateness of the redistributive implications of tort. In fact, in an
argument echoing the justifications for charitable immunity laws advanced
in the mid-19th century, some claim that it is unfair for a volunteer’s kind-
ness to be repaid with liability.54 That is, good beneficiaries should not bite
gift volunteers in the hand.
Second, legal scholars also concentrate on deterrence, predicting
both that immunity increases carelessness and that liability decreases vol-
unteering.55 Deterrent effects may be particularly strong for volunteers
because, unlike market actors, it is relatively easy for volunteers to quit
51A few authors also consider constitutional and other issues. See, e.g., Light, supra note 36, at
62–63 (arguing that the VPA violates federalism principles); Howard P. Benard, Little League
Fun, Big League Liability, 8 Marq. Sports L.J. 93, 127–28 (1997); Charles R. Tremper, Com-
pensation for Harm from Charitable Activity, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 401, 466–73 (1991); Robert
Flannigan, “Tort Immunity for Nonprofit Volunteers,” 84 Canadian Bar Rev. 1 (2005) (identi-
fying weaknesses in immunity).
52Hartmann, supra note 30, at 79; Jeffrey D. Kahn, Organizations’ Liability for Torts of Volun-
teers, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1433, 1445–46 (1985).
53Developments in the Law—Nonprofit Corporations, VI. Special Treatment and Tort Law, 105
Harv. L. Rev. 1677, 1690–91 (1992) [hereinafter Developments]; Popper, supra note 48, at 134.
54King, supra note 11, at 745–46; John Brown, Statutory Immunity for Volunteer Physicians: A
Vehicle for Reaffirmation of the Doctor’s Beneficent Duties—Absent the Rights Talk, 1-SPG
Widener L. Symp. J. 425, 440 (1996).
55See, e.g., Developments, supra note 53, at 1690, 1692; Tremper, supra note 51, at 426–27.
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when they perceive themselves to be exposed to liability.56 Others fear that
holding volunteers to a negligence standard will overdeter volunteering
because it fails to account for positive externalities provided by volunteers
while forcing the volunteers to internalize the cost of accidents.57 In addi-
tion to disagreeing about whether liability discourages volunteering, legal
scholars disagree about whether the volunteer immunity encourages it. Sup-
porters of immunity argue that it is necessary to generate human capital as
liability protection is necessary to generate financial capital in the corpo-
rate context.58
More skeptical observers predicted that the laws might be ineffective
because of: (1) the lack of uniformity among jurisdictions, (2) volunteer lack
of awareness of the laws, their exceptions, and their scope, (3) ambiguity due
to poor drafting and over which state’s law applies, and (4) plaintiffs’ ability
to forum shop.59 Sparse case law interpreting the state and federal Acts adds
to the uncertainty of volunteer protection.
Yet other scholars argue that when immunity is conditioned on a
volunteer’s or nonprofit’s ability to meet certain conditions, volunteers
will be hesitant to offer their services.60 The statutes only provide partial
56Benard, supra note 51, at 120–22; King, supra note 11, at 702, 734.
57Tremper, supra note 51 at 427–28.
58Tremper, supra note 51, at 443–44.
59Byrne by Byrne v. Fords-Clara Barton Boys Baseball League, Inc., 564 A.2d 1222, 1224 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1989) (finding an “ambiguity” in New Jersey’s volunteer coaches statute); Abraham,
supra note 7, at 105 (criticizing excessive judicial discretion); David W. Barrett, A Call for More
Lenient Director Liability Standards for Small, Charitable Nonprofit Corporations, 71 Ind. L. J.
967, 1000 (2000) (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing between recklessness and gross
negligence); Brown, supra note 21, at 571–72 (noting and denouncing unfair variation in the
law); Developments, supra note 53, at 1687, 1690 (noting disorder and poor drafting among
statutory protection schemes); Daniel Kurtz, Protecting Your Volunteer: The Efficacy of Volun-
teer Protection Statutes and Other Liability Limiting Devices, C726 ALI-ABA 263, 289 (1992)
(arguing that the variation creates “grave uncertainty” for insurance underwriters); Light, supra
note 36, at 21–22 (discussing how a state court might avoid applying the federal VPA); Rebecca
Mowrey & Adam Epstein, The Little Act That Could: The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 13
J. Legal Aspects Sport 289, 299–301 (2003).
601997 Hearing, supra note 7, at 10–13 (1997) (testimony of Sen. Paul Coverdell); Kenneth W.
Biedzynski, The Federal Volunteer Protection Act: Does Congress Want to Play Ball? 23 Seton
Hall Legis. J. 319, 349 (1999); King, supra note 11, at 703.
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immunity, commonly requiring volunteers to act in good faith or not be
grossly negligent or reckless. Moreover, they do not protect volunteers from
the expenses of defending against frivolous suits.
Strong claims about the incentive effects of immunity are unjustified
given the lack of evidence to support them. Furthermore, volunteers face
little risk of liability exposure in practice because they are rarely sued, and
although insurance may be expensive it can be purchased, and states can
choose to subsidize premiums to encourage additional coverage.61
B. Determinants of Volunteering: Empirical Findings
Little information about the relationship between immunity and volunteer-
ism exists. Previous studies include a few national opinion polls from the
1980s and scholarly studies regarding the factors that affect volunteer supply,
which, with one exception, overlook the relationship between immunity and
volunteering.
1. Survey Data
Immunity proponents relied on raw data from three surveys, which, although
reporting perceptions about liability in the 1980s, cannot explain the rela-
tionship between liability and volunteering. Peat Marwick commissioned a
1986 survey of 2,532 leaders at both nonprofits and for-profits in which 28
percent of nonprofit respondents identified a directors and officers liability
insurance crisis and 78 percent said that liability negatively affected gover-
nance.62 Only 6 percent of the respondents reported having a director resign
and 8 percent reported having had a board candidate decline membership
because of liability exposure; however, more respondents reported adopting
61Brown, supra note 21, at 572, 577; Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment Rule:
Should it Protect Nonprofit Directors? 103 Colum. L. Rev. 925, 961 (2003); Brenda Kimery, Tort
Liability of Nonprofit Corporations and Their Volunteers, Directors, and Officers: Focus on
Oklahoma, 33 Tulsa L.J. 683, 689 (1997) (arguing that the “uncertainty” of liability prevents
individuals from volunteering); The Quality of Mercy: “Charitable Torts” and Their Continuing
Immunity, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1382, 1394 (1987) [hereinafter Quality of Mercy].
62Directors’ and Officers’ Liability: A Crisis in the Making, National Survey Conducted by
Opinion Research Corporation and Research Strategies Corporation (1987), reprinted in 1988
Hearing, supra note 22, at 108–37. The survey included 569 corporate CEOs, 678 museum
directors, 121 orchestra/symphony executives, 153 independent sector executives, 80 associa-
tion of governing boards chairpersons, 367 university presidents, 350 hospital executives, and
224 public, municipal officials. Id. at 111.
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new governance procedures to address liability.63 In 1986, the National
Association of Corporate Directors surveyed 370 corporate directors, finding
that one in seven had refused to serve on a board (including a for-profit
board) without liability protection, whereas 4 percent had resigned from such
a board.64 Finally, in 1988, the Gallup Organization surveyed nonprofit
executives and directors, identifying a widespread perception that liability was
reducing volunteering: 20 percent of executives reported reductions in their
volunteer leadership force and 14 percent reported eliminating programs
because of liability risk.65 The executives also reported concern about drasti-
cally increasing liability insurance premiums.66 Sixteen percent of directors
reported that they had withheld their volunteer services due to a fear of
liability; only 2 percent had ever been sued, including employment disputes.67
2. Who Volunteers and Why?
Although empirical scholars have provided compelling models for volunteer
supply, they have yet to consider whether and how tort liability affects the
decision to volunteer. Many studies suggest that volunteering is not exclu-
sively altruistic, implying that liability exposure may affect the potential
volunteer’s self-interested decision regarding whether to volunteer.
Economists largely focus on the relationship between volunteering and
wages to determine the wage elasticity of volunteer labor supply. Some
identify a significant negative wage effect (i.e., since the opportunity cost of
volunteering increases wages, volunteering decreases as wages increase),
whereas others find little evidence of any effect or even a positive wage effect.68
63Id. at 115. Protective measures included new information reporting systems, fundamental
review of governance procedures, and recruiting members with specific expertise to the board.
Id. at 119.
64Id. at 120–21.
65Gallup Organization, Liability Crisis and the Use of Volunteers by Non-Profit Associations: A
Survey Conducted for the Foundation of the American Society of Association Executives 9, 21
(Jan. 1988).
66Id. at 8.
67Id. at 31–32.
68Paul S. Carlin, Evidence on the Volunteer Labor Supply of Married Women, 67 S. Econ. J. 801,
816 (2001).
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Many studies conclude that volunteering is explained by self-interested
utility gains rather than pure altruism, suggesting that decreasing the price
of volunteering through immunity should increase the volunteer rate.
Empiricists have identified a warm glow that comes both from increasing the
supply of public goods and from giving itself.69 There are both consumption
(getting pleasure, improving health) and investment (meeting people to
increase business contacts) aspects to volunteering, which may explain the
positive correlation between volunteering and wages.70
Menchik and Weisbrod find evidence of both consumption and
investment, and identify a negative relationship between an individual’s
net wage rate and hours volunteered.71 They fail to find the expected
crowding-out relationship from increased government expenditures for
aggregate volunteerism, which would suggest altruistic volunteering, but
did find such a relationship in the higher education and social welfare
fields. Brown and Lankford also find a strong positive relationship between
donations of money and time, concluding that individuals have various
“tastes for donating” and that donation of money and time are gross
complements.72
69James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow
Giving, 100 Econ. J. 464 (1990).
70Woods Bowman, Confidence in Charitable Institutions and Volunteering, 33 Nonprofit &
Voluntary Sector Q. 247, 248 (2004) (citing J. Wilson & M. Musick, The Effects of Volunteering
on the Volunteer, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 141 (1999)); Hartmann, supra note 30, at 74
(noting that young volunteers obtain valuable experience whereas older volunteers gain a sense
that they are “doing something useful” with their skills); Francois Vaillancourt, To Volunteer or
Not: Canada, 1987, 27 Canadian J. Econ. 813, 823 (1994).
71Paul L. Menchik & Burton A. Weisbrod, Volunteer Labor Supply, 32 J. Pub. Econ. 159, 179
(1987).
72Eleanor Brown & Hamilton Lankford, Gifts of Money and Gifts of Time: Estimating the Effects
of Tax Prices and Available Time, 47 J. Pub. Econ. 321, 333 (1991). See also Nancy Wolff, Burton
A. Weisbrod & Edward J. Bird, The Supply of Volunteer Labor: The Case of Hospitals, 4
Nonprofit Mgmt. & Leadership 23, 26 (1993) (citing R. Dye, Contributors of Volunteer Time:
Some Evidence on Income Tax Effects, Nat. Tax J. 33, 89–93 (1980)); James Andreoni, William
G. Gale & John K. Scholz, Charitable Contributions of Time and Money 24–25 (1996) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (using a Hicksian notion of substitution to find that gifts of time and money
are substitutes but the empirical magnitude of the compensated cross-price effect is very small),
available at 〈http://econ.ucsd.edu/~jandreon/WorkingPapers/ags-v8.pdf〉.
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Finally, Freeman analyzes the socioeconomic characteristics of volun-
teers (e.g., women and parents volunteer more than others).73 Consistent
with previous studies, he also finds a strong correlation between volunteer-
ing and giving, concluding that some people have a taste for charity. He
argues that standard labor supply substitution behavior—for example, the
higher the wage, the higher the opportunity cost of volunteering—explains
only some of these results. Rather, volunteering can be best understood as a
conscience good, which he defines as “public goods to which people give
time or money because they recognize the moral case for doing so and for
which they feel social pressure to undertake when asked, but whose provision
they would just as soon let someone else do.”74
Feldman recently decomposed separate effects of a reduction in the tax
price of monetary donations on giving and volunteering: the direct effects
on donations of money and of time, and the indirect effect of changing the
relative prices on donations of time where the “price” can be thought of as
the shadow value of time.75 She finds that time and money are substitutes—
that is, lowering the price of donating money causes people to shift from
labor toward money donations—and that researchers had overlooked this
effect because other, nonprice factors influence the relationship between
giving time and money. For example, financial donors are relatively likely to
be asked to volunteer.
3. Immunity and Volunteering
In the only previous study to examine immunity and volunteering directly,
Judd predicts that liability exposure reduces the utility of volunteering under
both the consumption and investment models of volunteering.76 Under a
consumption model, the motivation to volunteer should decrease as the
expected cost in the form of liability risk increases. Under the investment
73Richard B. Freeman, Working for Nothing: The Supply of Volunteer Labor, 15 J. Lab. Econ.
S140 (1997).
74Id. at S141.
75Naomi E. Feldman, Choosing Between Charitable Activities (Ben-Gurion U., Monaster Center
for Econ. Res., Paper 16, 2005), available at 〈http://www.econ.bgu.ac.il/papers/208.pdf〉.
76Terry W. Judd, Volunteer Labor Supply and Liability of Volunteers (Mar. 30, 1998) (unpub-
lished M.A. dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute) (on file with authors).
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model, liability decreases the volunteer’s lifetime earnings, which also
decreases a volunteer’s willingness to invest time.
Judd estimates the effects of two measures of liability exposure on
volunteering in 1992. He first considers state litigiousness, measured by the
per-capita tort case load in state trial courts. He also attempts to quantify
volunteers’ liability exposure under state immunity statutes by adding the
number of exceptions to general immunity listed in each state statute. He
finds no relationship between volunteering and immunity statutes, but does
find that residents in states with high per-capita tort filings volunteer less
than others.
Our study improves on Judd’s work in important ways, including using
comprehensive controls and multiple years of data. We also consider the
scope of immunity statutes, whereas Judd treats alike statutes that immunize
all volunteers and only some volunteers.77 Further, he incorrectly treats the
“exceptions” to the immunity statutes as noncumulative. For example, his
exceptions include bad faith, willful/intentional acts, recklessness, and gross
negligence. However, if a person acts willfully, for example, he or she also
satisfies the requirements of acting recklessly.
IV. Methodology
A. Data
Volunteering data are from the Independent Sector (IS) Giving and Volun-
teering in the U.S. surveys (1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1999, and 2001).
The IS commissioned the Gallup Organization to conduct the first six
surveys (in person) and Westat to conduct the 2001 survey (random-digit
dialing). The 2001 survey included new questions and organization, but the
questions in our analysis were consistent across all years. Although the 2001
survey oversampled certain groups (African-American, Hispanic, and
wealthy households) to obtain sufficient samples, our models control for
these categories. State civil filings are from the State Court Caseload Statistics
77Judd notes that he only considers statutes that provide protection to “ ‘line worker’ type of
volunteers.” Judd, supra note 76, at 25. However, he apparently considers whether the state
protects any non-director or officer, and not whether they protect all volunteers. For example,
Judd gives California a score of 0, meaning that volunteers in California have the lowest level of
liability exposure. Id. at App. 1. However, in California, only nonprofit directors and officers and
a few other narrow categories of volunteers (architects, engineers, and emergency rescue
personnel) have any immunity.
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Annual Reports (1986–2003) published by the National Center for State
Courts. State population data are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. State
wages are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. State unemployment rates
are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.78 Income tax itemization rates
are from the Internal Revenue Service.79
B. Empirical Strategy
We first compare volunteer rates in various immunity regimes. We categorize
the immunity into five regimes: (1) up to, but not including, gross negli-
gence or recklessness from state law; (2) up to, but not including, willful and
wanton or intentional behavior from state law; (3) up to, but not including,
gross negligence or recklessness from state and federal law; (4) any immu-
nity from any source; and (5) no immunity. Our taxonomy tracks the statutes
and the Restatement of Torts by categorizing the standards by increasing levels
of culpability: negligent, grossly negligent, reckless, willful and wanton, and
intentional conduct.
In the basic regression specification, we ask whether volunteering
differs by state volunteer liability regime. Because we are interested in the
overall effects of liability protection on volunteering, we designed this model
to account for both state and federal law in our base model. As explained
above, the VPA sets a floor below which states cannot fall unless they opt out
of the Act. Individual and state control variables and descriptive statistics are
listed in Table 2.
We model the effects of legal regime as follows:
E Volunteer Year I D E Lit it it it it_ ,( ) = + + + +[ ]Φ β β β β β0 1 2 3 4 (1)
where Volunteer_Year is a categorical variable measuring whether the respon-
dent claimed to volunteer for a government or nonprofit organization during
the previous year. As required by the VPA, volunteering encompasses all types
(e.g., religious, sports, education) and levels (directorships and line volun-
teers) of volunteering if the service is provided through a formal entity. The
78Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, available at 〈http://
www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm#data〉 (last visited Aug. 12, 2008).
79IRS. Statistics of Income Bulletin. Annual Reports, Washington, DC (1988, 1990, 1992, 1994,
1996, 1999, 2001).
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Table 2: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition
Full
Sample Volunteers
Any State
Immunity
Statute
No State
Immunity
Statute
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Year (0,1) variable, 1 if
year = 1990
0.142 0.141 0.132 0.150
(0.349) (0.348) (0.339) (0.357)
(0,1) variable, 1 if
year = 1992
0.140 0.136 0.130 0.146
(0.347) (0.343) (0.337) (0.353)
(0,1) variable, 1 if
year = 1994
0.079 0.070 0.080 0.078
(0.270) (0.256) (0.271) (0.268)
(0,1) variable, 1 if
year = 1996
0.142 0.125 0.145 0.140
(0.349) (0.331) (0.353) (0.347)
(0,1) variable, 1 if
year = 1999
0.134 0.125 0.141 0.128
(0.341) (0.313) (0.348) (0.344)
(0,1) variable, 1 if
year = 2001
0.218 0.300 0.253 0.195
(0.413) (0.458) (0.435) (0.396)
Volunteered year (0,1) variable, 1 if
respondent
volunteered in
past 12 months
0.529 1 0.549 0.516
(0.499) (0) (0.498) (0.500)
Liab. imm.—Any level State has immunity
statute
0.599 0.639 1.000 0.323
(0.490) (0.480) (0.000) (0.468)
Liab. imm.—GNR State immunizes
volunteers up to
gross negligence
or recklessness
0.489 0.514 0.730 0.323
(0.500) (0.500) (0.444) (0.468)
Liab. imm.—WINT State immunizes
volunteers up to
willful/wanton or
intentional
0.110 0.126 0.270 0.000
(0.313) (0.331) (0.444) (0.000)
State unemployment Unemployed state
residents/state labor
force by year
5.556 5.442 5.201 5.793
(1.504) (1.481) (1.312) (1.578)
Mean state income Total state income/total
state labor force
participation
27,048 27,005 26,036 27,730
(5,364) (5,182) (5,115) (5,411)
State civil litigation Annual state civil
filings/annual state
population
0.743 0.739 0.760 0.729
(0.350) (0.346) (0.376) (0.331)
State tax itemizer rate Itemized state
returns/state tax
returns by year
30.645 30.935 29,931 31,129
(6.707) (6.758) (7,591) (5,965)
Age Respondent’s age 46.6 45.8 46.872 46.348
(17.2) (15.9) (17.343) (17.072)
Age2 Respondent’s
age-squared
2,463 2,350
(1,745) (1,587)
608 Horwitz and Mead
Table 2 Continued
Variable Definition
Full
Sample Volunteers
Any State
Immunity
Statute
No State
Immunity
Statute
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Household children # of children <18 0.860 0.927 0.878 0.852
(1.224) (1.243) (1.244) (1.211)
Child2 # of children <18-squared 2.237 2.405
(5.145) (5.192)
Employed (0,1) variable, 1 if
respondent employed
at interview
0.617 0.676 0.611 0.620
(0.486) (0.468) (0.487) (0.485)
Sex (0,1) variable, 1 if
interviewer identifies
respondent as male,
0 if female
0.479 0.450 0.479 0.480
(0.500) (0.498) (0.500) (0.500)
Hispanic descent (0,1) variable, 1 if
respondent identifies as
Hispanic
0.126 0.088 0.127 0.126
(0.332) (0.284) (0.333) (0.332)
Income2 (0,1) variable, 1 if income
$10,000–$14,999
0.070 0.047 0.078 0.064
(1.254) (0.213) (0.268) (0.245)
Income3 (0,1) variable, 1 if income
$15,000–$19,999
0.072 0.051 0.081 0.066
(0.258) (0.220) (0.272) (0.248)
Income4 (0,1) variable, 1 if income
$20,000–$24,999
0.074 0.067 0.075 0.073
(0.262) (0.249) (0.264) (0.260)
Income5 (0,1) variable, 1 if income
$25,000–$29,999
0.092 0.087 0.113 0.078
(0.289) (0.282)) (0.317) (0.268)
Income6 (0,1) variable, 1 if income
$30,000–$34,999
0.095 0.096 0.084 0.102
(0.293) (0.295) (0.278) (0.303)
Income7 (0,1) variable, 1 if income
$35,000–$39,999
0.081 0.087 0.065 0.092
(0.272) (0.281) (0.247) (0.289)
Income8 (0,1) variable, 1 if income
$40,000–$49,999
0.110 0.121 0.107 0.112
(0.313) (0.326) (0.309) (0.315)
Income9 (0,1) variable, 1 if income
$50,000–$74,999
0.171 0.208 0.165 0.176
(0.377) (0.406) (0.371) (0.381)
Income10 (0,1) variable, 1 if income
$75,000–$99,999
0.059 0.075 0.058 0.059
(0.235) (0.263) (0.234) (0.236)
Income11 (0,1) variable, 1 if income
 $100,000
0.081 0.099 0.075 0.085
(0.273) (0.298) (0.264) (0.279)
Married (0,1) variable, 1 if
respondent identifies
married
0.612 0.664 0.616 0.068
(0.487) (0.472) (0.486) (0.488)
Religious group
member
(0,1) variable, 1 if
respondent identifies
member of a church or
synagogue
0.595 0.663 0.645 0.559
(0.491) (0.473) (0.478) (0.497)
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surveys defined volunteering as “not just belonging to a service organization,
but actually working in some way to help others.”80
80Independent Sector, Giving and Volunteering in the United States, Findings from a National
Survey 2001 Appx. B, p. 146. In previous years, the statement was slightly different, including the
ending clause “for no monetary pay.” Independent Sector, Giving and Volunteering in the U.S.,
Technical Documentation, ch. 5, 1996 Giving and Volunteering Survey Questionnaire 40
(1996).
Table 2 Continued
Variable Definition
Full
Sample Volunteers
Any State
Immunity
Statute
No State
Immunity
Statute
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
School2 (0,1) variable, 1 if high
school grad
0.327 0.285 0.343 0.317
(0.469) (0.452) (0.475) (0.465)
School3 (0,1) variable, 1 if trade,
2-yr coll. grad, or 4-yr
coll. incomplete
0.281 0.312 0.250 0.302
(0.450) (0.463) (0.433) (0.459)
School4 (0,1) variable, 1 if 4-yr
coll. grad
0.236 0.316 0.239 0.234
(0.424) (0.465) (0.426) (0.423)
Race–black (0,1) variable, 1 if
respondent identifies
black
0.138 0.105 0.149 0.131
(0.345) (0.307) (0.356) (0.337)
Race–Asian (0,1) variable equal to
one if the respondent
identifies Asian
0.010 0.008 0.008 0.011
(0.099) (0.091) (0.091) (0.105)
Race–other (0,1) variable, 1 if
respondent identifies
Native American, Pac.
Islander, other, or
belonging to 2
categories in 2001
0.046 0.044 0.048 0.045
(0.210) (0.204) (0.215) (0.206)
Social capital* Braatz/Putnam index -0.197 -0.143 -0.318 -0.114
(0.557) (0.579) (0.662) (0.455)
N 19,132 10,128 7,765 11,370
Notes: *The Braatz/Putnam index does not include data for either Alaska or Hawaii. For the
social capital measure, N = 19,062 in the full sample and N = 10,091 in the sample of volunteers.
For other variables, N varies by one or two observations. Columns with descriptive statistics
for observations from states with “Any State Immunity Statute” include only data from states
that have immunity via state Acts. They do not include states that have immunity via the federal
1997 Volunteer Protection Act. Left-out categories include 1988, income = <$10,000,
education = high school incomplete.
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I are the two main variables. We first construct I as a binary variable
measuring whether the respondent lives in a state with either federal or state
immunity up to, but not including, gross negligence or recklessness. Then
we construct I to measure immunity up to, but not including, willful or
intentional conduct. We treat states that immunize only directors or particu-
lar volunteer types, such as firefighters, as not immunizing volunteers in
general.
D are demographic variables associated with the propensity to volun-
teer, including the respondent’s race, age, number of children, employment
status, membership in a religious institution, income, and education. Both
women and religious organization congregants are disproportionately likely
to volunteer.81 Women may volunteer more than men because they work
fewer hours, are more involved in children’s activities, or, if they are high
earners, may seek to preserve their human capital while not doing paid
work.82 Religious group members may be particularly generous or have
greater opportunity to volunteer than others.
We include a variable for children because, among married women,
both volunteering rates and the number of hours volunteered are positively
correlated with the number of children in the household.83 We include a
children-squared variable, in part, as a proxy for the time to volunteer. We
expect the coefficient on the squared variable either to be smaller in mag-
nitude than the children variable or negative because people with many
children likely have less time to volunteer.84 Similarly, because we assume
81Debra J. Mesch, Patrick M. Rooney, Kathryn S. Steinberg & Brian Denton, The Effects of Race,
Gender, and Marital Status on Giving and Volunteering in Indiana, 35 Nonprofit & Voluntary
Sector Q. 565, 568–69 (2006); Vaillancourt, supra note 70, at 818 (finding that Canadian men
volunteer less than women). Cf. David Horton Smith, Determinants of Voluntary Association
Participation and Volunteering: A Literature Review, 23 Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Q. 243,
248 (1994) (listing studies with mixed results and earlier studies concluding that men volunteer
more).
82Carlin, supra note 68, at 817.
83Among married women, a “10 percent decrease in the average number of children per family
would reduce the incidence of volunteering by about 1 percentage point.” Carlin, supra note 68,
at 811.
84Vaillancourt speculates that volunteering will increase with the number of children (between
the ages of 3–15) because socialization needs increase. Vaillancourt, supra note 70, at 817.
Carlin finds that having more children increases the probability of volunteering but reduces the
time volunteered. Carlin, supra note 68, at 802.
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that volunteering likely varies over a lifetime, we include age and age-
squared variables. Research on peak volunteering ages vary, with some
showing the peak between 30 and 44 years and others showing it around
middle age or during a broader “middle years” (from 35 to 55) period.85 On
the contrary, it is possible that the time available to volunteer comes later in
life. Perhaps retired people may have more time to volunteer,86 although
they may have less physical ability.
Because education is a strong predictor of volunteering, we include
five levels of education based on the highest level reached: high school,
high school graduate, post high school but less than a four-year college
degree, four-year college degree or more, and none of the above.87 We
also include two measures of race and ethnicity. Respondents self-
identified as Hispanic and as either white, black, Asian, or other.88 Studies
predict lower participation among “dominant minorities, such as African-
Americans and Hispanics.”89 Finally, we include indicator variables for 11
85Carlin, supra note 68, at 804; Smith, supra note 81, at 248.
86Smith, supra note 81, at 257, n.2; see also James E Curtis, Edward G. Grabb & Douglas E. Baer,
Voluntary Association Membership in Fifteen Countries: A Comparative Analysis, 57 Am. Soc.
Rev. 139, 150 (1992) (analyzing volunteer data from 15 countries, finding that “those in the
middle-aged or older cohorts are more likely to join voluntary organizations”); Neal E. Cutler,
Toward an Appropriate Typology for the Study of the Participation of Older Persons in Volun-
tary Associations, 9 J. of Voluntary Action Res. 9, 10–12 (1980) (analyzing 1972 survey data of
Americans to find that age is correlated with increased volunteering for farm, religious, frater-
nal, and veteran organizations); J. Allen Williams, Jr. & Suzanne T. Ortega, The Multidimen-
sionality of Joining, 15 J. of Voluntary Action Res. 35, 37 (1986) (analyzing 1973 survey, finding
age is correlated with membership in church-related, fraternal/service, and civic/political
organizations).
87Smith, supra note 81, at 248. For each year except 1988 there were separate designations for
college graduate and graduate school. Because the data did not include the graduate school
designation in 1988, we created a new category representing college graduate or above.
88The survey included only black, white, and other in 1988; added Asian in 1990; added Native
Americans and Pacific Islanders in 1996; and allowed respondents to identify two races in 2001.
We coded Native Americans, Pacific Islanders, and those who reported two races (133 respon-
dents) as other.
89Smith, supra note 81, at 249. Smith suggests that racism, leading to relatively low socioeco-
nomic status among nonwhites, explains these results. Id. However, controlling for socioeco-
nomic characteristics, we find racial minorities tend to volunteer less than whites. More study
is needed to identify the determinants of any disparity. See Mesch et al., supra note 81, for
review.
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categories of income because volunteering is positively associated with
income.90
E are state economic variables. We include state unemployment and
income (total income divided by total labor force population in each state)
as proxies for the opportunity cost of volunteering. Not only an individual’s
income but also the average income and economic options of those around
the volunteer determine the opportunity cost of volunteering.
T is the percentage of state tax filers who itemize their taxes (total
itemized filings divided by total filings) and is included to account for the
cross-price effects between time and money donations. The relationship
between giving time and giving money depends on the price of each, and the
price of giving money varies by state tax regime. If money donors are able to
deduct giving from income tax, the price of making donations is lower than
it would be otherwise.
We construct L, the state civil litigation rate, by dividing state civil
filings by state population. We hypothesize that even if a potential volunteer
does not know the liability risk of volunteering, he or she may perceive a
greater risk in states with relatively high levels of civil lawsuits.
Finally, because the probability of volunteering within a state is likely
not independent, we allow for an arbitrary covariance matrix within each
state over time, clustering the standard errors at the state level. We also
adjust the models for heteroskedasticity.
After performing the initial analysis, we estimate the effects of volunteer
immunity laws by replacing I with J, a series of alternative variables. We use
three alternative specifications: (1) where J is a single variable for any state or
federal volunteer immunity; (2) where J are two variables for (a) any state
immunity and (b) federally imposed immunity; and (3) where J are three
variables measuring (a) state immunity up to, but not including, gross neg-
ligence or recklessness, (b) state immunity up to, but not including, willful
and wanton or intentional behavior, and (c) federally imposed immunity.
E Volunteer Year J D E Lit it it it it_( ) = + + + +[ ]Φ β β β β β0 1 2 3 4 (2)
90Freeman, supra note 73, at S150; Menchik & Weisbrod, supra note 71, at 174–75. Some
researchers might square income as well. We do not because researchers have found that
volunteering peaks at incomes over $100,000; our top category was >=$100,000. Smith, supra
note 81, at 248 (citing V.A. Hodgkinson et al., Giving and Volunteering in the United States:
1992 Ed. (Independent Sector 1992)). Income categories are listed in Table 2.
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V. Results, Sensitivity Tests, and
Study Limitations
A. Results
The aggregate, unadjusted data suggest a positive correlation between vol-
unteering and immunity. Respondents in states with immunity were 9 per-
centage points more likely to volunteer than respondents in states without
immunity (p < 0.01) (see Figure 1; Table 3). Further, respondents were
more likely to volunteer in states with relatively high levels of immunity
compared to those in states with lower levels.
The main regression results, which exclude a time trend, demonstrate
a significant association between volunteering and immunity (Table 4,
Columns 1 and 2). Estimating the probability of volunteering with control
variables set at their mean values, volunteering in states with immunity up to
Figure 1: Percentage of respondents volunteering during previous year, by
regime.
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gross negligence or recklessness was approximately 8.36 percentage points
higher than in states without immunity (p < 0.01). We find a larger effect,
9.18 percentage points, among respondents in states with more immunity
(p < 0.05).
Respondents also volunteer less in states with comparatively more civil
litigation. An increase of one civil suit per 1,000 people is associated with
7.33 percentage points less volunteering (p < 0.05).
Table 3: Percentage of Respondents Volunteering in Previous Year, by
Immunity Regime
Source State State or Federal
Immunity Level
Gross
Neg/Reckless Willful/Intent
Gross
Neg/Reckless
Any
Immunity No Immunity
Yes 53% 60% 56% 57% 48%
No 47% 40% 44% 43% 52%
# Respondents 5,670 2,096 9,341 11,437 7,695
Table 4: Regression Results, Volunteer Rates by Immunity Regime
Model Type
1 2 3 4
Linear
Probability Probit
Linear
Probability Linear Probability
Additional Variables Year Dummy State Fixed Effects
Coefficient
State or federal, GNR protection 0.0751*** 0.211*** -0.0004 0.0519
(0.027) (0.075) (0.022) (0.033)
State, willful/intent imm. 0.0823** 0.234** 0.030 0.004
(0.038) (0.109) (0.034) (0.044)
State civil litigation rate -0.0641** -0.184** -0.033 0.194*
(0.031) (0.091) (0.023) (0.100)
Constant 0.165 -0.926*** 0.239*** -0.350***
(0.088)* (0.254) (0.077) (0.110)
Observations 19,132 19,132 19,132 19,132
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. Results control
for unemployment rate, mean state wage, state tax itemization, age, age2, # children, # children2,
employment, sex, Hispanic descent, income category, marital status, racial category, religious
group membership, and education level.
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B. Sensitivity Tests: Rejecting Alternative Explanations
1. Year Trends and State Fixed Effects
Our results cannot rule out an effect of either a secular trend or unobserved
state characteristics. Here we present additional tests, including alternative
regression specifications, to help determine whether immunity, rather than
a time or state effect, explains the results.
One would ordinarily include an indicator variable for year of survey in
the main specification, particularly given the increase in volunteering in
2001 (Figure 2 and 3). However, because many states passed legislation in
1988 or earlier and federal preemption applied everywhere in 1997, we
suspected that year variables would absorb much of the immunity effect
because of multicollinearity. Including a year dummy, the coefficient on the
high-level immunity variable remains positive (about 3 percentage points)
and the coefficient on low-level immunity is effectively 0 but, as we predicted,
Figure 2: Volunteer rates by year.
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the coefficients on both are statistically insignificant (Table 4, Column 3).
Unfortunately, we cannot solve this problem with adding data because there
are no pre-1988 observations in the data set.
Still, there are reasons to believe that immunity, rather than timing
alone, might explain at least some of the results. First, we find no secular
time trend in the aggregate data, a result confirmed by others.91 Second, we
find evidence that each of our measures of immunity were highly collinear
with survey year.92 Still, the results may be caused by (1) endogeneity (states
with more volunteering disproportionately adopted immunity statutes), or
(2) an unobserved characteristic that both causes volunteering and exists
disproportionately in states with immunity.
91Laura Leete, Work in the Nonprofit Sector, in The Nonprofit Sector (2006) at 169, tab. 7.4.
92The condition indices for the relationship between various immunity variables and survey year
ranged from 891–1,174 where an index of 30 suggests strong collinearity. Peter Kennedy, A
Guide to Econometrics 213 (5th ed. 2003).
Figure 3: Observations by immunity regime and year.
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To investigate these alternatives, we first use a fixed-effects approach—
examining changes in volunteering rates within states before and after the
adoption of immunity laws—rather than examining differences between states
with and without laws.93 This approach allows us to control for state-specific,
time-invariant omitted variables, but it does not necessarily eliminate endo-
geneity. Although the magnitude is smaller than in the basic specification,
the results are positive (Table 4, Column 4). The coefficient on state or
federal lower-level protection is relatively large and positive (5.19 percentage
points). The results for higher levels of state protection are not significantly
different from zero. These insignificant results are unsurprising given that
few states implemented immunity, particularly at the higher levels, during
the study period. We therefore pursued an additional approach.
We recoded as Year-0 the year of state immunity adoption, from either
state or federal sources. We coded each year after as 1, 2, 3, and so on, and
each year before as -1, -2, -3, and so on, thereby separating the effects of
immunity from a year trend. The results are most clearly seen in Figures 4a
and 4b.94 Including a year trend variable and state dummy variables, we
identified a difference in average state volunteering trends before and after
states adopt immunity statutes, regardless of the adoption year. Figure 4a
shows an increase in volunteering rates after states enact immunity laws,
regardless of the enactment year. Figure 4b, which controls for being asked
to volunteer, shows a sharper difference in volunteering trends: average state
volunteering rates decline before and increase after the enactment year.
This test excludes 1988 because the survey did not ask respondents whether
they were asked to volunteer (Figure 4b). These results support the idea that
volunteering is responsive to immunity. They cannot, however, tell us
whether the laws came just at the point where respondents were motivated
both to act politically and volunteer.
Finally, we used a difference-in-difference approach to determine
whether the federal VPA had a differential effect in states where it pre-
empted state law.95 We found no significant differences between states that
93Technical problems limit the application of the fixed effects to models with categorical
dependent variables and yield a predictable upward bias. Ethan Katz, Bias in Conditional and
Unconditional Fixed Effects Logit Estimation, 9 Pol. Analysis 379, 380, 384 (2001).
94These results are confirmed by significant coefficients. Results available from authors.
95The difference-in-differences method compares treatment and control groups before and
after an intervention (here the VPA). States that were eligible for preemption (those with no
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immunity before 1997) were the treatment group, and the remainder were the control group.
We compared the change in volunteering in the treatment group to the change in volunteering
in the control group before and after the federal Act was passed.
Figure 4: Volunteering rates before and after adoption of increased
protections.
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already had volunteer immunity and others. We found that although the
VPA had no independent effect on volunteering in states where it was
implemented (i.e., states with no immunity before 1997), the coefficient on
the post-1997 variable was positive even in states that already provided
immunity.96
2. Other Sensitivity Tests
Given the geographic distribution of immunity statutes, it is difficult to think
of plausible left-out variables that are both correlated with volunteering and
disproportionately found in states with immunity.97 One possibility is
that social capital—the strength of social connectedness or social
engagement—is both correlated with voluntarism and with the political will
to protect volunteers. To address this alternative explanation, we examine a
model including Bratz and Putnam’s social capital index.98 The index is the
average z score of (1) nonprofit organizations per capita in 1989, (2) 1991
newspaper circulation per capita, (3) voter turnout in the 1988 and 1992, (4)
association memberships per capita from the General Social Survey, 1974–
1994, and (5) the social trust measure from the General Social Survey,
1972–1996.99 This measure not only controls for differences in state resi-
dents’ propensity to volunteer but, because it includes a count of nonprofits,
also controls for state differences in volunteering opportunities.
Social capital is strongly correlated with volunteering. Including the
controls in Equation (1), a one-unit increase in the social capital z score is
related to approximately 8 percentage points more volunteering.100 Yet the
relationship between immunity and volunteering appears stronger than in
96Details available from authors. Controlling for all variables in the basic specification, probit
coefficient = 0.182, p < 0.01.
97In addition to the formal tests described below, in informal investigations we found no
relationship between state immunity laws and voting patterns in previous presidential elections.
98Jay Bratz & Robert Putnam, Families, Communities, and Education in America: Exploring the
Evidence 19 (1996).
99Jonathan Skinner & Douglas Staiger, Technology Adoption from Hybrid Corn to Beta Block-
ers 556, in Hard-to-Measure Goods and Services: Essays in Honor of Zvi Griliches (Ernst R.
Berndt & Charles M. Hulten eds., 2007).
100The social capital coefficients are 0.0724 (linear probability model) and 0.0832 (probit model
estimated at means), both p < 0.01. Results available from authors. Excludes Alaska and Hawaii.
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the basic specification; states with immunity show approximately 11 percent-
age points (up to gross negligence/recklessness) or 10 percentage points
(up to willful/intentional) more volunteering.101 Interaction tests demon-
strate that the effect of social capital does not vary by immunity type.
Because previous research suggests that volunteers are commonly moti-
vated by social obligation, we also tested the relationship between immunity
and being asked to volunteer.102 Because the 1988 survey excluded the
question of whether respondents were asked to volunteer, these tests
excluded 1988 data. Controlling for being asked—a large predictor of vol-
unteering (coefficient 0.455, p < 0.001)—respondents were more likely to
volunteer when immunized: 5.2 percentage points (p < 0.001) in lower-level
states and 1.5 percentage points in higher-level states (insignificant). We
found no significant effects among respondents being asked to volunteer,
which likely indicates selection on an endogenous variable. Perhaps volun-
teers are more likely than nonvolunteers to be recruited, or altruistic people
make themselves available for recruitment.
We also considered whether there might be variation in the amount
rather than on overall participation. That is, potential volunteers might
adjust time donations rather than forego volunteering according to liability
exposure. Among respondents who volunteered for at least one hour in the
previous month, volunteering was higher in states with immunity than in
states without immunity, although the results were not statistically significant
(lower-level protection, 0.788 hours per month; higher-level protection, 1.33
hours per month).
C. Study Limitations
In addition to those discussed above, the data raise four limitations. First,
they are self-reported and retrospective. Second, the number of observations
and survey method changed in 2001. These changes raise a particular
concern given the large increase in volunteer rates that year. However,
because the surveys were performed in May, June, and July 2001, we know
that the 2001 increase in volunteering does not reflect increased volunteer-
ing after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Further, the 2001 survey targeted
101Results, based on probit model estimated at mean values (p < 0.01), available from authors.
102Leete, supra note 91, at 166–67 (citing Freeman, supra note 73). Test results available from
authors.
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only adults 21 years and older, whereas the earlier surveys targeted adults 18
and older. There is no a priori reason to believe, however, that the self-
reported data, survey changes, or increase in observations had a differential
effect in states with or without immunity. Moreover, the additional observa-
tions appear not to be concentrated in states with a particular immunity
regime—in Figure 3, the lines representing the increase in respondents
from 1999 to 2001 are roughly parallel, particularly for respondents in states
with volunteer immunity up to either gross negligence or recklessness and in
states with no state immunity (i.e., where the federal immunity applied).
Third, there were no respondents in 13 states for at least one survey year.103
However, there appears to be no correlation between liability regime and
missing data. Where demographic information was missing from the IS
surveys, we imputed values by using the median value for the variable in the
state. Finally, the surveys did not differentiate between wage and other
income, making for an imperfect proxy for the opportunity cost of volun-
teering.
The state litigation variable was also imperfect.104 It included all civil suits
rather than only tort suits, which would, arguably, make for a better measure
of the real liability risk to volunteers. The data on tort litigation by state,
however, are inconsistent across states and only sporadically reported.105
VI. Insights, Implications, and Conclusions
Despite limitations, we believe that the cross-sectional results suggest a plau-
sible positive relationship between volunteering and immunity and, there-
fore, consider the implications of the relationship.
103Nebraska, Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, Iowa, and Vermont had no 1999 data, New Mexico
had no 1996 data, and South Dakota and the District of Columbia had no 1992 data. Montana
had no data for 1996 or 1999. Idaho had no data for 1988, 1999, or 2001. Alaska only had data
for 1990 and 2001, and Wyoming only had data for 2001.
104Because Mississippi provided no data on state civil filings until 1990, we extrapolated the value
for 1988. We took the average percentage change in civil filings from 1990–2002 (2003 was an
outlier), extrapolated back from 1990 to 1988, and then divided civil filings by the 1988
population. The resulting litigation rate value in 1988 is 0.384, the 1990 value 0.40. Other
extrapolation methods yielded consistent results.
105Missing values ranged from approximately 0.5 percent to almost 10 percent of the observations.
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A. The Supply Side: Why Do People Volunteer?
Economic theories on volunteering are based on the underlying idea that
people weigh the costs and benefits of volunteering. Tort liability alters the
potential volunteer’s utility calculation by raising the costs of volunteering
without raising corresponding benefits.
How might this work? Our results are consistent with the idea that
liability exposure raises the expected cost of volunteering in at least three
ways. (1) The volunteer’s own-price evaluation—the tradeoff between volun-
teering versus working—changes because an hour worked must be com-
pared not only to an hour not earning any wage but to a potential loss from
tort liability. (2) The cross-price evaluation—the comparison to prices of
unrelated activities such as leisure—changes because volunteering becomes
more expensive relative to these other activities. (3) The direct expected risk
of income loss increases with liability exposure. As we discuss in detail below,
however, we question whether the direct financial effects of tort law offer the
most plausible explanation for our findings.
Among people who were asked to volunteer (yet were similar in terms
of socioeconomic and state characteristics), immunity laws seem to have no
effect. It might be that pleasing recruiters or volunteering with friends and
acquaintances increases the benefits of volunteering more than liability
exposure increases the costs. Perhaps volunteering is not fully voluntary.
People volunteer because of social pressure, and these results suggest that it
takes social pressure to overcome the potential cost of liability. However,
Freeman also suggests that people volunteer from moral imperative,106 yet
our results suggest that such an imperative (to the extent it exists) is not
strong enough to overcome the aversion to liability exposure for some
people who are not asked to volunteer.
B. The Demand Side: Why Do Organizations Want Volunteer Protection?
We know comparatively little about why organizations use volunteer labor
or how immunity affects the demand for volunteers. The widespread orga-
nizational support for volunteer immunity—including most of the nation’s
largest nonprofits—raises some puzzles. One might expect limited demand
for volunteers; they may crowd-out donations or government support,
violate labor contracts, complicate relations with paid staff, or come with
106Freeman, supra note 73, at S140.
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high direct costs of recruiting, screening, training, managing, and retain-
ing volunteers.107
In short, free labor is not a free lunch, and volunteer immunity may
make it more expensive for organizations in two ways: it shifts liability onto
the organization, and it increases liability by removing individual incentive
effects of tort exposure for individual volunteers. Although it is true that “the
lower the wealth-at-risk of an enterprise, the greater the likelihood that a
volunteer will be sued personally in the event of a harmful incident,” the
inverse is also true.108 If an individual volunteer is immune, a plaintiff can
make direct and indirect claims against the nonprofit. This increased risk
was only briefly mentioned in the 1997 VPA hearings and dismissed as an
issue “best handled by organizational liability insurance.”109
Despite the potential cost of increased liability—either because plain-
tiffs increasingly sue organizations or because of an increase in the underly-
ing riskiness of volunteer behavior—the additional volunteer labor may be
worth it to the nonprofit. In some cases, such as free health clinics, organi-
zations simply cannot operate without volunteer labor.110 There are hints in
the VPA history that demand for volunteers was not satisfied. Further, schol-
ars predict that nonprofit growth and changing demographic conditions will
lead to increased competition for volunteers.111
107See, e.g., Leete, supra note 101, at 167; Femida Handy & Narasimhan Srinivasan, The
Demand for Volunteer Labor: A Study of Hospital Volunteers, 34 Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector
Q. 491 (2005).
108Kevin E. Davis, Vicarious Liability, Judgment Proofing, and Non-Profits, 50 U. Toronto L.J.
407, 415 (2000).
1091997 Hearing, supra note 7, at 65 (prepared statement of Robert K. Goodwin, President &
CEO, the Points of Light Foundation).
110Observers have suggested that malpractice exposure deters physicians from volunteering,
particularly when the physician’s liability insurance will not cover volunteer activities or where
a retired physician has no malpractice insurance. Paul A. Hattis, Overcoming Barriers to
Physician Volunteerism: Summary of State Laws Providing Reduced Malpractice Liability Expo-
sure for Clinician Volunteers, 2004 Univ. Ill. L.R. 1033, 1036, 1033–34. During the study period,
several states immunized physicians, either through general volunteer immunity statutes or
specific health-care statutes. However, we found no evidence that health-care organizations were
influential players in lobbying efforts to secure volunteer immunity. More traditional voluntary
organizations, such as the Little League, dominated discussion.
111Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Economy 62–63 & app. A (1988) (from 1967 to 1985, nonprofits
increased from 309,000 to 900,000 organizations); Wolff, Weisbrod & Bird, supra note 72, at 24.
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Finally, some organizations are themselves immune from suit. Some
state immunity statutes extend to nonprofit organizations, and remnants of
charitable immunity exist in several states, including damage caps, protec-
tions against vicarious liability, and immunity from suits by charitable ben-
eficiaries.112 There is some evidence that after passage of state laws,
nonprofits reorganized to create their own immunity, separating their risky
activities from their assets, leaving victims without compensation and
reducing incentives for nonprofits to “engage in prudent risk-management
activities.”113
These issues need further study. We plan to examine the potential
interactions between organizational and individual immunity in future
work.114 One such question is to what extent, if any, organizational liabil-
ity influences individual conduct, and vice versa. These tradeoffs between
112Regarding nonprofit immunity, see, for example, D.C. Code Ann. § 29-301.113(d) (limiting
nonprofit liability for negligent volunteer to extent of insurance); N.H. Rev. Stat. § 508:17(II)
(limiting nonprofit liability for negligent volunteer to $250,000); Utah Code Ann. § 78-19-3
(limiting nonprofit liability for volunteers who commit intentional or willful and wanton act).
Remnants of common-law charitable immunity exist in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Maine,
Maryland, New Jersey, Utah (abrogated but restored by statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-19-3),
Virginia, and Wyoming (Nonprofit Risk Management Center, supra note 9, at 8), as well as in
Tennessee (when payment of the tort judgment would divert charitable funds and the tort arises
out of the organization’s core charitable activities); cf. Applewhite v. Memphis State Univ., 495
S.W.2d 190, 197 (Tenn. 1973); Gamble v. Vanderbilt Univ., 200 S.W. 510, 512–13 (Tenn. 1918).
Three additional states (Colorado, Massachusetts, and South Carolina) cap nonprofit tort
liability. Nonprofit Risk Management Center, supra note 9, at 9. California, for example,
protects nonprofits against vicarious liability for volunteers. Munoz v. City of Palmdale, 75 Cal.
App. 2d 367, 372, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 232 (1999) (no vicarious liability where volunteer placed
a coffeepot on shelf at senior center and injured woman), review denied (Cal. 1999). Virginia, for
example, immunizes charities from suits by charitable beneficiaries. Radosevic v. Virginia Inter-
mont Coll., 633 F. Supp. 1084, 1086 (W.D. Va. 1986) (applying Virginia law); Hill v. Leigh Mem’l
Hosp. Inc., 132 S.E.2d 411, 415 (Va. 1963).
113Harvey P. Dale, Speech Given on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of Peter Swords as
President of the Nonprofit Coordinating Committee 10 (Nov. 17, 1997) (citing several IRS letter
rulings, e.g., LTR 9721037 Feb. 28, 1997, approving reorganizations that segregate assets to, in
part, limit third-party liability).
114One might expect volunteer immunity laws to have little or no effect in states without
charitable immunity for organizations and to have a larger effect in states with organizational
immunity. This is because organizations might be more willing to recruit volunteers when they
are not liable for the negligence of those volunteers. In very preliminary testing of this hypoth-
esis, we have found no difference in volunteer rates in states with and without organizational
immunity. This might be because of the weakness of charitable immunity laws even in those
states that have them. We thank Jennifer Arlen for suggesting this extension.
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organizational and individual risk are complicated in the nonprofit context.
Davis, for example, argues that shielding a nonprofit’s wealth will not nec-
essarily give volunteers “an incentive to lead the enterprise into risky activi-
ties.”115 He claims that, unlike shareholders of for-profits who both control
corporations and benefit from cost-justified liability avoidance, nonaltruistic
donors will donate even though their donations go to tort victims rather
than to beneficiaries and judgment proofing will have little affect on them,
while altruists who disregard tort victims may withhold contributions from
charities.
On a practical level, our qualitative and quantitative results offer
insights to nonprofits that wish to recruit more volunteers. Although volun-
teers fear liability, this fear does not mean that immunity statutes are needed
or are even helpful. Accurate communication about underlying tort risk may
be more effective and fair than these statutes. Indemnification policies and
insurance may also assure the nervous volunteer in the absence of statutory
immunity.
C. Insights for Tort Law and Theory
1. Deterrence
A dominant theory characterizes tort law’s purpose as promoting social
welfare through accident deterrence; by forcing potential defendants to
internalize the costs of their risky behavior, they impose only efficient risks.
A central objection to this and related deterrence-based theories has been
that they are unrealistic.
[T]ort doctrines, however abstractly calculated to promote efficient resource
allocation, do not actually affect human behavior. Most people . . . do not even
know the doctrines of tort law; behavior in the face of danger is dominated by
concern with personal safety rather than with the financial consequen-
ces . . . and people lack sufficient information about the probability of an acci-
dent to make rational judgments concerning accident avoidance.116
Goldberg puts it simply: “a fundamental premise of the deterrence model is
that legal sanctions are capable of deterring, . . . [yet] . . . evidence suggests
115Davis, supra note 108, at 412.
116William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15
Ga. L. Rev. 851, 857 (1981). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common
Law Rules, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1717 (1982).
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that actors do not respond to the threat of liability with anything like
regularity.”117
Whether deterrence occurs is an empirical question. Although liability
exposure may not be the primary reason why people avoid volunteering, our
study provides some evidence to inform this debate. The law may inspire
people to increase care or, as we suggest here, avoid an activity altogether.118
People who live in jurisdictions without immunity are less likely than others
to volunteer, suggesting that individuals do indeed react to tort risk—or the
perception of that risk—through activity avoidance.
A compelling piece of evidence for the deterrent effect of tort law from
what we have observed here is that the activity-level deterrent effect increases
with the level of legal risk. People who live in regimes that shield volunteers
from liability for accidents caused by more careless behavior are more likely
to volunteer than those who live in regimes that shield negligence. Further,
our data are particularly useful because they suggest the deterrent effects of
tort liability on individuals, rather than on organizations. Despite the range
of tort defendants, both empirical analyses and legal doctrines tacitly assume
the tortfeasor is either an individual or a firm, but the two are unlikely to
respond to tort law in the same way.119 It is not that one of them is rational
and the other irrational; firms are not monolithic actors120 and individuals
commonly behave irrationally. But firms (with teams of lawyers) compared
to individuals (with limited legal knowledge) will likely differ in their
response of legal risk.
More concretely, we estimate that volunteer tort immunity generates
about $4.4 billion a year (0.035 percent of 2005 GDP). We base this estimate
on our finding of 7.5 percentage points more volunteering in states with some
immunity than in states no immunity.121 Since volunteers spent a median of 50
117John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 Geo. L.J. 513, 558 (2003).
118Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980).
119Croley, supra note 2, at 1705.
120Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. Legal
Stud. 833, 834 (1994).
121Using the same variables and data described above, the coefficient on a variable representing
respondents in states with any level of volunteer immunity, from either state or federal law, was
0.0748 (p < 0.01). This result may be an underestimate. Using a probit model, estimating all
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hours volunteering annually,122 we assumed that volunteers deterred by liabil-
ity exposure would have volunteered at the same level as those who were not
deterred by liability exposure. This assumption probably generates a higher
than accurate estimate because those who decide to volunteer are likely more
committed than those deterred by tort liability. We then assess the value of a
volunteer hour at $17.80, and adopt the CPS estimate that 65.4 million people
volunteered during the period.123 Using this number also introduces some
error because it includes volunteer rates in states with and without immunity,
but probably makes the estimate a lower bound of the immunity effect since
even volunteers in states with liability immunity do not have complete immu-
nity. Although it would likely be undesirable to have blanket immunity, it
would also likely induce more volunteering.
We believe these results are generalizable. Although social pressures
may be at play, no law forces anyone to volunteer or to purchase liability
insurance. Someone fearful of liability can simply choose not to volunteer.
This estimate does not, however, indicate whether the foregone activity is
efficient or fair. This depends on both the value and distribution of avoided
accidents. To the extent that tort law deterred particularly accident-prone
people, it may have had a good effect.124 To the extent it overdeterred by
causing people to forego volunteering altogether rather than simply mod-
erating their care, it had a bad effect. Without more information, there is no
a priori reason to believe that volunteering is a particularly risky activity and
that we would want to deter participation.125
variables at their mean values, the coefficient on the same variable = 0.0841 (p < 0.01). All
results available from the authors.
122September 2004 to September 2005. Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at 〈http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/volun_12092005.pdf〉.
123We average $17.55/hour (2004) and $18.04/hour (2005), both based on average hourly
earnings of nonsupervisory workers on nonfarm payrolls increased by 12 percent for fringe
benefits. See 〈http://www.independentsector.org/programs/research/volunteer_time.html〉.
Although the CPS are lower than the IS estimates of volunteering, the difference between
volunteering rates should be the same.
124In a related context, Hyman has suggested that people voluntarily rescue too much. David A.
Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 Tex. L. Rev.
933 (1997).
125Those who endorse deterrence as the best justification for tort “emphasize that accident rates
are typically correlated with levels of inherently risky activity,” so that strict liability may be
628 Horwitz and Mead
2. Risk Versus Perception
Although possible, we doubt that direct financial risk is the best explanation
for our findings. The probability of suit, either before or after the introduc-
tion of the immunity laws, appears to be quite small, with only a few reported
cases against nondirector volunteers.126 Moreover, immunity does not fully
protect volunteers from legal costs since volunteer-defendants must hire a
lawyer to raise immunity as an affirmative defense and have the burden of
proof on the issue. Further, at least in the short term, the laws are vaguely
drafted and without interpretive case law so that using them as an effective
defense would likely involve protracted litigation.
Volunteers may perceive that the immunity laws are effective and misun-
derstand the remaining financial risk of volunteering in regimes with immu-
nity. If true, why would volunteers be so knowledgeable about their liability
regimes yet so confused about their true risks under immunity? Publicity
about immunity appears not to be the answer; we found little mention of even
the federal Act in major newspapers. Maybe volunteers in states without
immunity perceive volunteering to be less valuable for reasons that are
related to liability exposure but not necessarily to the expected value of the
financial loss of exposure. For example, if volunteering is a consumption
good, liability exposure decreases the feel-good value of volunteering. It is
unpleasant to worry about getting sued for teaching Sunday School. To the
extent that volunteering is an investment good (e.g., a way for volunteers to
invest in their careers), the investment may appear to be worth less in regimes
without immunity (e.g., volunteers risk their reputations in lawsuits).
Or maybe the laws did something entirely different from their
intended goals. They may have directed public attention to volunteer oppor-
tunities. There is some evidence for this in the difference-in-differences
results, where we found that the VPA had no independent effect on volun-
teering in states where it was implemented. Publicity for the VPA could have
encouraged volunteering everywhere since it was not limited to the pre-
empted states. However, the relatively large effect in states with high immu-
nity levels is contrary to this interpretation.
warranted in certain high-risk situations. Don Dewees, David Duff & Michael Trebilcock, Explor-
ing the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts Seriously 5 (1996). However, it would be odd
to characterize volunteering as one of those contexts.
126H.R. Rep. 105-101(I) at 17 & n.1 (dissenting views) (noting that no witness identified a single
case that would be decided differently under VPA).
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3. Property Rule Versus Liability Rules
We also use our results to examine the idea that tort law is primarily an
appropriate vehicle for distributing accident costs among strangers (i.e.,
those who cannot express their risk preferences through contracting) or
where transaction costs are otherwise high.127 This model assumes that it is
more efficient for private parties to negotiate contracts than for tort law to
displace what would naturally arise from private initiative—so courts ought
to rely on property rules when they can and, as a positive matter, contracts
will flourish. Although some scholars have convincingly challenged these
views,128 others have defended the benefits of property over liability rules
because of their flexibility in allowing people to express their subjective
valuations.129
Our findings suggest that people do not contract when they can. Our
qualitative research suggests that volunteers understood (in fact, overesti-
mated) their liability exposure. Because volunteering is seldom a spur of the
moment decision, volunteers had ample time to negotiate risk—not with
potential victims, but with nonprofits. Potential volunteers could have exter-
nalized the cost of their negligence by asking nonprofits to indemnify them
or, at least, partially externalized the cost of their negligence with personal
insurance, perhaps quite easily through umbrella insurance or homeowner
policies, which typically include coverage.130 If tort law had been simply
displacing efficient, private initiative, we would not have found an effect
127Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1125–27 (1972) (suggesting that liability rules
are best suited for situations where bargaining is difficult).
128Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis,
109 Harv. L. Rev. 715, 719–21 (1996) (arguing that when transaction costs are high, liability
rules are not merely second-best rules but are preferable because potential injurers can make
efficient decisions with their private knowledge regarding the cost of accident avoidance; when
transaction costs are low, they demonstrate that with perfect information the two rules are
equivalent, but with imperfect information neither rule is to be preferred a priori); James E.
Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light,
70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440 (1995) (arguing against the conventional wisdom that judges should use
liability rules when transaction costs are high).
129Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, 2 Rev. L. & Econ. 137
(2006); Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 Yale L.J. 2091, 2120 (1997).
130Volunteers have disproportionately high incomes and, therefore, are likely to own homes.
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from the passage of liability protection laws because private agreements,
reflecting the preferences of volunteers and others, would have been in
place already.
Several possible interpretations of our results inform a long-standing
puzzle over the property versus liability rules debate, at least regarding its
practical application. Maybe people did insure against liability or force non-
profits to do so on their behalf; perhaps we identified an effect because the
immunity laws imposed excess protection from liability compared to that
which volunteers were willing to purchase. Although this level of protection
was not worth it to the volunteers, it may still have been efficient from a
societal perspective if social welfare was increased by motivating more people
to volunteer. We find this explanation unlikely given many anecdotes from
nonprofits that potential volunteers felt too exposed to liability to volunteer.
More likely, people simply failed to negotiate the distribution of risk that
they would wish in advance. They were too busy, lazy, or confused to do so
(yet, paradoxically, some took the time and expense to advocate for legal
change). Therefore, tort law may provide a useful administrative fix even
where parties can negotiate.
There are, however, explanations other than failed initiative. It may be
that volunteers wanted liability insurance, but could not obtain it. Immunity
advocates advanced several anecdotes suggesting that this was the case.131 If
liability insurance was unavailable because of a market failure, a socially
productive activity was displaced for the wrong reason; immunity, therefore,
works in a second-best world where insurance market failures cannot be
addressed directly. In the face of such market failures, theorists have sug-
gested that tort law acts as an appropriate administrative remedy.132
But maybe insurance was unavailable because the nonprofits did not
like the price. In this case, immunity would represent an inefficient redistri-
bution of accident costs away from the tortfeasor. Under this explanation,
the statutes were part of a negotiation over liability. The immunity was either
an effective way for volunteers to fully place the cost of risky behavior on
victims or nonprofits, or it was part of an overall program on the part of
nonprofit organizations to encourage tort reform—an explanation with
1311988 Hearing, supra note 22, at 14.
132Priest, supra note 25, at 1588.
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plenty of evidence in the record.133 The Helicopter Association Internation-
al’s letter in support of immunity, which amounts to little more than a
complaint that flying helicopters is risky and expensive to insure, urges
Congress to adopt “general tort reform with emphasis upon products liability
and aviation products liability relief.”134 This possibility is also suggested at
the state level.
Despite data and methodological limitations that prevent us from con-
clusively establishing a causal connection between volunteering and immu-
nity, we offer evidence that indicates a positive association. We suggest that
one cost of tort liability is that it likely deters volunteers. This does not mean
that using immunity to increase volunteering is worth it—we know neither
the benefits of tort liability in terms of accident reduction nor the charac-
teristics of those potential volunteers who are deterred by perceived tort
exposure. It may, in fact, be less costly to indemnify volunteers or to educate
potential volunteers on the risks of being sued. Given the potential of the
relationship between immunity and volunteering for explaining the deter-
rent effects of tort law, we intend this study only as a first step and plan
further work with more comprehensive data sources.
133See, e.g., 1988 Hearing, supra note 22, at 40 (letter from Colen Eidel, Chairman & Barbara
Holden, President, Junior League of Great Falls). Washington legislators were convinced that
state volunteer immunity was “important because it protects credit union volunteers, and the
federal law does not. Volunteers are the backbone of credit unions.” Washington Senate Bill
Report 1643, Senate Committee on Judiciary (Mar. 29, 2001).
1341988 Hearing, supra note 22, at 69 (letter from Frank L. Jensen, Jr., president of Helicopter
Association International); see also id. at 78 (letter from Albert H. Quie, president, Prison
Fellowship Ministries).
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